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1. Historical background
   Six years have passed since the Chile tsunami and a defense program, started 
after that disaster, is now nearing completion. Along the extensive Sanriku coast, 
the tsunami defense program has greatly changed the landscape. The author was 
interested in analyzing the human reaction to the natural disaster and the influences 
of this program upon local communities. He organized a research group composed of
members of the Institute of Geography, Tohoku University, to work on this problem. 
Some of the reports of the survey have been published, and others will be published 
by the members of the group in various publications. 
   From time immemorial, tsunami') have been a nightmare for the inhabitants 
of the Sanriku  coast.2) Here, the coast line is indented with numerous embayments 
surrounded by steep slopes, making a typical rias coast. This is the scene of repeated 
tsunami disasters, and in the history of Sanriku, there are many records of tsunami 
of incredible magnitude which caused large loss of human lives and the destruction 
of many settlements. Traveling in this district, we often encounter monuments 
commemorating tsunami which were erected by our ancesters as a warning for 
posterity. Following is a brief list of the more recent sunami disasters along this 
coast. (Fig. 2), (Table 1) 
   According to old documents, a tsunami n the  JOkan era (896) killed some 
1,000 people, and the  Keiche• tsunami of 1611 drowned nearly 5,000 people. In 
the Meiji era, there was the great Sanriku tsunami of 1896 which was responsible 
for an enormous disaster. The toll of lives was 23,309 in the coast of Iwate prefecture 
where the damage was the heaviest, and this was really 23 per cent of the total 
population of the six coastal counties of that prefecture. In our generation, we
1) Destructive high waves caused by earthquakes. See Toshio Noh et  al.: Reports 
      on Chile Tsunami, May 24, 1960. The Science Reports of the Tohoku  University, 
      7th series, (Geography), 1961. 
2) Sanriku literally means the three provinces, Rikuzen,  Rikuch5 and Mutsu, which 
      were subdivided from the former greater Mutsu province in 1868. Today,the 
      coast belongs to three  prefectures; namely Aomori, Iwate and Miyagi.
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 Fig.  2.  A  monument for  111eiji  Sanriku 
 Table  1.  NIajor  isrrnanti since  the
   ...;`1„k1-40,c1 
 1Cojirahama, 
Meiji era.
 ICarnaishi
Names used in this paper 
Chile tsunami 
 Ojika tsunami 
 ShOwa  Sanriku tsunami 
 Meiji  Sanriku tsunami 
(Coast  of I wate prefecture)
 1)ate 
 May.  24, 
 Mny 1, 
 March 3, 
 tine 16, 
March 22,
 19611 
1939 
1933 
1896 
 1894
 Number  of casualties in 
 Sanriku area. 
122 dead, 791  injured,  2,4118 
   entirely destroyed
26 dead 
 4,192 dead,  1,152  injured 
26,761 dead, 4,396 injured 
 Several
the 
houses
     (There  ‘Vere  ma,nv minor  tsunami in  between, causing minor destruction) 
already experienced two large  tsanami, in 1933 and  1961) respectively. It happened 
 that these last two  tsunami were sharply different in the distribution of the 
maximum heights of the waves, and accordingly in the nature of the destruction 
 they caused. The difference is mainly reduced to the different nature of the waves 
themselves; namely, the recent one was caused by an earthquake with its epicenter 
off the coast of Chile very far from Sanriku, and  the other was due to an earthquake 
with its epicenter 28 kilometers to  the northeast of  Kinkasan,  Mivagi prefecture. 
The distance from the epicenter affects not only the magnitude of  tsunami  but also
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the  periodicity of the waves, resulting in different distribution of wave heights within 
the embavments which they  attack. 
 Terrible experiences repeated in different generations are passed as oral 
traditions and are accumulated  in the memory of the inhabitants of the afflicted 
districts, teaching them to work for the defense. To the people of former days, 
however, such means  were limited. Often the  solution was to move the entire  settle-
ment to a higher  location free from the danger. This is a thorough solution, but 
it brings various disadvantages pecially along this coast where people are highly 
dependent  on fishing as a means of living, and where the rias nature of the coast 
allows little room for settlements and  arable land.  When  the memory of  the 
disaster fades, the people gradually return to  the coast to become  victims of  the 
next  ts.anami. 
 To build earthen embankments along the coast or surrounding the villages is 
a more passive but an effective means  of defense. Naturally  the people in old 
days were handicapped by  the low standard of engineering  technology. Yet many 
embankments were constructed especially near the villages on the low alluvial 
plains along the coast. At some places, the ground level was raised by constructing 
platforms. This is practical, especially for individual house-lots,  but to raise 
the ground level of  an  entire village or larger section of a town or a city is another 
problem because of the scale of  engineering involved. (Fig. 3) 
   Afforestation along  the coast is another method winchwas widely adopted. 
Densely planted forests were expected to break  the power of  tsunami torrents, 
and they  often have proved to  be effective. Black pines,  Pimi's  thumbergii,  s the 
only  species that  can be grown  effectively on the coastal sand-dunes. For  the
 V
 Fig. 3.  H.aised  house  platforms,  imw  within  the  defense wall,  TarO.
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purpose of  tsunami defense, the pines were planted  very densely on the beach ridges 
and sand-dunes. It is understandable that  they help slow down or weaken the 
power of invading waves, and also stop  the floating objects which sometimes are  very 
destructive. The forests are also useful because  they settle and protect the  arable 
land from the restless sand-dunes of the coastal area. There are  many pine 
forests along the entire coast of Sanriku, many of which are old in their origin. 
Although it is not clear whether they were originally designed as  tsunami defense 
or for the protection of the coast in general,  there is good reason to assume that 
these thickly planted coastal forests were  probably raised for defense against 
tsunami. (Fig. 4)
     Fig.  4 Pine trees on the embankment  along the beach.  Sabusawa„ Matsushima. 
 II. Defense work after the  ShOwa Sanriku tsunami 
   The  Sh6wa Sanriku  tsunami of 1933 was an epoch-making  incident in the 
 history of the defense work against  tsunami,  although in the scale of the calamity 
it brought about, it was smaller than the preceding  Meiji Sanriku  tsunami of 1896. 
That it made an epoch  was  mainly because  the disaster  took place in this genera-
tion with its command of  modern engineering technology which permits large scale 
 counter-measures to a much greater extent than in the preceding generation. 
    After  this  tsunami, the  111()ving of many settlements or at least parts of them 
to higher localities was carried out as part  of the programs of the prefectural govern-
ments and with prefectural subsidies. In  Iwate prefecture, provision was made to 
move 2, 199 houses in  21) towns and villages, and in  Mivagi prefecture,  81)1 houses in 
15 towns and villages.  Where the  tsunami waves had been very high,  the plans 
were duly executed, such as in the cases of  RvOri and  Hong6 to the south of  Rarnaishi,
 N01-1
and at  Ozaslii to the south of Shizugawa. At  RyOri,  1,347 people were killed in 
1896, but not  many houses were moved to higher localities after the tsunami. In 
1933, here the  tsunami waves reached the height of 18.0 meters, and drowned 187 
people. At  Hong& after the virtual annihilation in 1896, the village was 
rebuilt in its old site, and in 1933, all the houses but one were destroyed and 
326 people were killed. After 1933, all the houses were built on terraced house-
lots on the slope, and were free from the destruction by the Chile  tsunamin. (Fig. 
5) The town of Ogatsu,  Miyagi prefecture, is located along a narrow bay, and most 
of its house-lots were lower than two meters above sea level. By the  ShOwa Sanriku 
tsunami, 361 houses were destroyed and 9 peopole were drowned by waves 3.85 
meters high. As there is no room for house-lots in higher location, the ground 
level was raised up to 3 meters  by filling-in, and a narrow belt of lowland along 
the  bay was designated as an area in which it was prohibited to build residential 
houses. However, with the development of the town, the prohibition came to be 
ignored gradually, and houses also were built here only to be destroyed  by the Chile 
 tsunami which brought 4 meter high waves into this bay.
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   In various villages and towns, concrete walls were built often with heights 
of more than ten meters. The wall in the town of  Tara is an example of the most 
elaborate work. The  built-up area of the town is situated about  500 meters inland, 
and a little more than five meters above the sea  level, The ShOwa Sanriku tsunami 
brought here waves with a height of 14.15  m.,  and heavily damaged the town. 
After this disaster, a radical defense program was laid out by the town in which the 
lower side of the town was surrounded  by a concrete wall  10.5  m.  high, and in 
order to protect the rice fields, the lowland along the beach was afforested. (Fig. 6) 
Thus the town of  Tar(?) was strongly protected at the time of the Chile  tsunami, and 
the built-up area of the town was free from  the damage,  although flooding of the 
rice fields was not prevented. In some other villages and towns, the walls 
constructed after 1933 proved effective protection in  1960. However, the defense 
work after the ShOwa Sanriku tsunami was carried out largely  by individual  nmni-
cipalities with some subsidy from the national government, and  very naturally the 
huge expenses involved made it difficult for most of the  afflicted towns and villages 
to undertake large scale  counter-measures. After this tsunami, planting of black 
pines was also done widely both to protect the settlements and to reinforce the 
embankments and concrete walls. It is actually a continuation of the routine 
program of coastal conservation. However, black pines are slow growing trees and 
it takes almost half a century before they grow to a considerable size, while the 
changes in cultural landscape are fast, often resulting in the cutting of the trees 
in order to use the land for other purposes.
Fig. 6. Defense  wall constructed after the ShOwa Sanriku tsunami.  Tarn.
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    A submarine arthquake off the west coast of Chile caused tsunami waves, 
which crossed the whole range of the Pacific Ocean, in 16 hours attacked the coasts 
of Hawaii islands, and in 23 hours reached the Sanriku coast early in the morning 
of May, 24, 1960. Total damages in the Tohoku district included 123 dead and 
missing, 945 injured, 465 houses entirely destroyed and 21,000 houses inundated. 
It is estimated that financial loss amounted to 263 billion yen.1) The pattern of the 
distribution of the maximum wave heights due to a far-off earthquake like this, is 
much different from the pattern due to closer ones. For instance, the highest 
waves often appeared at the heads of bays instead of near the bay mouths which 
are usually exposed to the highest waves in case of the tsunami of the latter kind. 
At the time of the Chile tsunami, at many places where the  ShOwa Sanriku tsunami 
caused little damages, there were high waves and accordingly severe destruction, 
in spite of the fact that the heights of the waves were generally smaller this time 
than in 1933. For instance, at the head of Yamada bay, Iwate prefecture, the highest 
wave of 4.80 m. appeared this time compared to 4.00 m. in 1933. At Origasa to the 
south of the town of Yamada, there was practically no damage from the last 
tsunami, but 89 houses were entirely destroyed this time. In the same way, many 
lowlands at the heads of deep embayments which had escaped the destruction from 
the  Sh61A/a S nriku tsunami were badly inundated  by the Chile tsunami. 
   Thus it was the time to think over counter-measures for both kinds of 
tsunami. This time, the national and prefectural governments started large scale 
programs for this purpose, and a large amount of money was appropriated as a 
subsidy. For the whole length of the Sanriku coast, numerous defense projects 
were laid out, and construction started on large scale. Ports were protected with 
breakwaters, and the main parts of cities were handled with special care. In many 
cities and towns along the coast, systems were organized for evacuation in time 
of emergency. 
   For the materialization of these programs, there were various problems to be 
solved first, in accordance with the difference of the objects to be protected, and 
due to the various circumstances peculiar to the places. 
III. Problems to be solved 
   Technological progress in the twenty-seven years since the last large tsunami 
has enabled us to solve many of the problems which were not solved at that time. 
Yet the financial problem was the limiting factor. As a whole, the national  govern-   
) Bureau of Rivers, Ministry of  Construction: Reports of economic survey on the 
         inundation caused by Chile Earthquake tsunami.  (Shizugawa-machi), 1961 (in 
         Japanese), (Figures are slightly different according to the source of information.)
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ment was far more active this time, in extending aid to the afflicted istricts. Not only 
its activities for the immediate rescue of the people, and the provision of emergency 
housing, but the national government gave a high proportion of the construction 
costs. Such funds were distributed through miscellaneous channels. Several 
bureaus of the Ministries of Construction, Transportation, and Agriculture and 
Forestry started to work for the guidance both in  technics and finance. Prefectural 
governments generally took care of the actual layout and operation. Various 
sections of prefectural governments, for instance, the sections of engineering, farm-
land, rivers and coast, fishing ports and so on, were entrusted with the enforcement 
and supervision of the construction work. The division of work among numerous 
government bureaus and sections was made mainly on the bases of the kinds of 
objects to be protected. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry took 
care of fishing ports, while the construction works at commercial ports were under 
the leadership of the Ministry of Transportation. The former was also in charge 
of the protection of farmland, while the embankments along rivers were under 
the control of the Ministry of Construction. 
   It is not the aim of this paper to go into the details of technical problems 
concerning the construction. The author is mainly interested in the relationship 
between the defense work and the fulfilment of the functions of settlements. He is 
also interested in understanding the disadvantages which the defense work may 
 bring. Of course, the technical problems are also important o adjust the  contradic-
tory relations and to get rid of the disadvantages if there are any. 
   Many of the more important settlements in Sanriku coast are ports, either 
fishing ports or commercial ones. Hence the defense work must be laid out not 
only to enable them to maintain their function as ports, but also to reserve enough 
room for their future development. Concerning the ports of small fishing villages 
where  only hand-operated small boats are used, it is sufficient to invent some measure 
to enable the fishermen to carry their boats inland over the concrete walls. For 
larger ports, the problems are more complicated. There are various facilities at the 
water front of such a port inseparable from the function of the port. Such are the 
fish market, ice plants, warehouses, an office of the fishing association, repair mills 
and so on. It is necessary for them to be near the water front, and  if they are 
separated from it, the function of the fishing port should be paralyzed. At the same 
time, such facilities must be closely connected to the hinterland, particularly to the 
main part of the city or the town. 
   The situation is simpler in famring villages. There, the largest problem is 
the drainage. The land used as rice fields in the small coastal plains is mostly 
low and poorly drained from the beginning. When concrete walls with heights of
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five to six meters are to be built along the coast, some devices are indispensable to 
get rid of the surplus water. The water-gates with steel doors that can be shut 
tightly, and the drainage pipes with a device to prevent clogging by sand at the 
mouths are the necessary measures. The situation is more complicated at the mouths 
of the rivers. Usually it is impossible or impractical to close the larger rivers 
with water-gates near their openings into the sea. Apart from it, the rivers must 
be protected with embankments to prevent the floods. As the defense for 
tsunami, the banks must be raised to hold the high water table caused by the 
inflow of the sea water in the case of a tsunami. It depends on the nature of the 
respective river whether it can be shut with a water-gate, or how far upstream the 
river banks must be raised. 
  If a bay is narrow enough, and the depth of the bay allows, it would be a good 
idea to shut a bay with breakwaters. Of course it is impossible to shut a port 
entirely. A passage must  be open for the ships. According to the experience of 
last several tsunami, it was proven that breakwaters were very effective in 
checking the high waves with shorter periodicity due to the earthquakes near 
this coast. Tsunami waves with longer periodicity caused by far-off earthquakes 
are not controlled very effectively by means of breakwaters, though the wave 
heights were lowered to some extent. Therefore, by building breakwaters at 
bay mouths it is possible to cut the heights of walls by several meters along the 
 .-;oast behind them. 
 [V. Defense work after the Chile tsunami 
   Right after the disaster of the Chile tsunami, the central government started 
 :0 take measures for the prevention of future tsunami disasters. Various programs 
 vere laid out for the aid of afflicted districts, and construction was scheduled for 
:ompletion by the end of the fiscal year of 1966. A large amount from national 
)udget was allotted for this program, and the prefectural governments involved 
vere entrusted with the details of the layout and operation of the plans. The 
 nefectural governments and also municipal offices made their own programs, too. 
['hey were subsidized by the central government, but the ratio of the subsidy 
 Taxies in accordance with the nature of the construction work. The routes by 
vhich national and prefectural subsidies are delivered through various bureaus and 
ections of the governments, and in different proportions under numerous head-
ngs, are so complicated that it is practically impossible to get a clear idea of the 
otal expenses. Nevertheless, the programs were operated efficiently, and much of 
he work has been completed and the rest is progressing fast, excepting a few cases.
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(1) Walls along the coast 
    Concrete walls alongthe coast make the core of the defense work. Their main 
 objectives are to protect the settlements,  arable land, and sometimes the forests. 
The maximum wave heights at the time of the Chile  tsunami were used as the standard 
 on which the heights of the walls were calculated with some marginof safety, 
usually one to two meters. Generally, the walls are about five to six meters high 
because the maximum heights of the waves of the Chile tsunami were four to five 
meters in most cases. (Fig. 7, Fig. 8) There are places where the wave heights 
at the time of the  Shdwa Sanriku  tsunami were much higher than those of the Chile 
tsunami,  but this program is for the defense work concerning the Chile tsunami, 
and the formality in government  bureaucracy did not allow to use the former levels 
as a standard for the engineerings of this time. Some of such situations were solved 
by relying  upim programs of other category.  For instance, at Ono about 12km. to 
the  south of  Ofunato, the wave height in 1933 was 7.65  m.,  but in 1960 there was 
no damage from the Chile  tsunami. To build a high wall of 8.15 in., the plan was 
switched to the program of the conservation of the coast,  which meant cutting the 
ratio of national subsidy in  half. At  Shimogarci, 8 km. to the northeast of 
Ofunato, an  8.20  m. high wall was constructed on the same principle. 
   At the outlets of smaller rivers, water-gates are built for the purpose of 
drainage, and steel gates attached to which will be shut when a tsunami alarm is
•<~
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   Fig. 7. Fig. 8. 
Fig.  7.  Coastal  settlement protected with a  \vall.  Unosumai.  Ka,maishi 
Fig. 8.  Defense wall under  construction.  Mivako.
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given. Usually, the operation of the gates in case of tsunami s entrusted to local 
municipalities, whose obligation it is also to check the gates once in a while. Some 
of the larger rivers, too, are controlled by water-gates, like the case of the 
Hachiman river  and the Minajiri river in  Shizugawa. In other cases, river banks 
are raised along larger rivers upstream to a height above the possible tsunami 
 waves. Here, the banks are usually connected with the existing river banks for 
flood defense. An example of the construction work combining the coastal walls 
with river banks is shown in a map (Fig. 10). The river is the Tsugaruishi which 
is located to the south of  Mivako. Here the coastal walls are 6.74 m. high, and 
river banks are connected with them maintaining the height from the sea level at 
their tops. Where the first bridge crosses the Tsugaruishi river, the banks reach 
the height of a little over six meters, and it was calculated that the height was 
sufficient o hold the inflow of the sea water in time of a tsunami. 
   The types and the cross sections of the walls are various,  mainly according 
to the different government bureaus which took charge of the construction work. 
Exmaples of different cross sections are shown in Figure 9. In some cases, the 
flat tops of the walls are widened to seven to eight meters and are used as roads. 
If this device was adopted  systematically, an enormous amount of money should be 
saved in the future for the construction of national highways in this part of 
Tohoku. However, the emergency nature of this program and the sectionalism in
the bureaucracy were far from allowing such a  flexibility to combine these different 
 types of programs. 
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    The existence of high walls along the coast of fishing villages is very inconvenient 
in the daily life of fishermen. Their activities on the beach are hindered, and the 
walls prevent hauling boats up the shore. Sometimes, gates are fixed in the walls 
but they not only weaken the walls but add to expenses. For smaller settlements, 
steps are attached to the walls to cross over them. At some small fishing ports, 
concrete "aprons" are attached in front of the walls to moor the boats, and slanted 
causeways are constructed to faciliate the transportation of boats over the  walls. 
(2) Afforestation as a defense for tsunami 
    Black pines were planted at manyplaces after the Chile tsunami, too. It was 
done mainly for the protection of coast but serves also for the defense of settlements 
and arable land. The location of the forests is sometimes within the walls, and 
sometimes outside. When the forest is planted outside the walls, another lower 
concrete wall is often built to protect the forest. Where the menace on the 
settlement is not very serious, afforestation is widely adopted as a defense measure. 
The coast of  Hirota bay to the south of Rikuzen-Takada is a good example. Here, 
the coast is bounded by beach ridges, and there are not many houses near the sea. 
The open nature of the coast, however, allowed the inundation of large  arable land 
in 1933 and 1960. For about five kilometers on the west coast and three kilometers 
on the north coast of the  bay, pine forests were planted for the defense, under a 
heading of the conservation of the coast. 
   If we can rely upon concrete walls perfectly, and if the calculated heights 
of the walls are sufficient for any tsunami that may come in the future, there 
would be no use of these forests as tsunami defense. Of course, the forests still 
have the function to settle the dunes, and they will also be useful as windbreaks. 
If the waves were to invade over the walls, or if the walls were to be broken by 
the tsunami, the ancient device of defense forests might play an important  role  : who 
knows? 
(3) Breakwaters 
   At two places in the Sanriku coast, large plans to close the bays at their 
mouths were adopted; namely at Ofunato  bay, Iwate prefecture, and at Onagawa 
bay, Miyagi prefecture. In  both cases, the shape of the bays and the depth at the 
mouths of the bays were suitable for the adoption of these ambitious plans. 
   At Ofunato bay, breakwaters across the bay at its mouth are now under 
construction. The strait is 740 meters wide, and the maximum depth of the site 
of the breakwaters i 37 meters. Breakwaters when accomplished, will be 5 meters 
high above the surface of the sea, and their top will be 12-14 meters wide. A 
passage for ships will be open approximately in the middle of the strait. The
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passage will be 200 meters  wide and 15.7 meters deep, which is supposed to be 
sufficient for 100,000 ton ships. The total budget of this work is 1,850 million yen. 
(Fig. 11) 
    From the experiments using models, it was concluded that the height of waves 
in case of a tsunami due to a far-off earthquake will be lowered by  2.0-2.6 m. by 
reducing the opening of the  bay by these breakwaters. They are expected to work 
much more effectively against sunami waves with shorter periodicity, namely those 
due to the earthquakes with epicenters nearer to this coast. Thus the heights 
of the concrete  walls along the Ofunato bay may be reduced by two meters. 
Actually, the wave heights at the time of the  ShOwa Sanriku tsunami along the 
coast of this  bay were  5.30-5.95m., but in this defense program the walls were 
constructed with heights of 3.00-4.05m. The expenses thus saved from the 
projects along the bay which originally came from three ministries of the central 
 govemment, were put together to build the breakwaters. 
   The idea and the principle of the engineering at Onagawa bay,  Miyagi prefecture, 
are largely same  as those of the  Ofunato  bay. Here the strait is 708 meters wide, 
and the maximum depth is 28 meters. The opening in the breakwaters i 150 
meters wide. Possibility of the projects of the same kind was investigated atseveral 
places. For instance, at Miyako bay the depth of the  bay is too large and it was 
concluded that the engineering of this principle was impractical, and the plan was 
adopted to build walls five to seven meters high along the coast of the  bay. 
(4) Protection of the main parts of cities and towns 
   The idea of raising the level of the ground by  filling-in may be practicable 
for limited areas. It is often carried out individually by the owners of the real 
estate, and is often adopted as a  part of defense program. However, it involves 
too large a work to raise the ground of a more or less large area to a considerable 
height. The town of  Ogatsu,  Miyagi prefecture, was badly destroyed by two 
tsunami as above mentioned. After the  ShOwa Sanriku tsunami it was planned to 
move all the houses out of the low coastal belt to higher location appointed by the 
town. The lowland within the appointed area was raised by means of introducing 
the soil. This program was partly materialized,  but  there remained a number of 
houses in the low belt and some of them were built even after 1933. This area was 
again afflicted by the Chile tsunami. In Ogatsu, 87 houses were washed away, and 90 
houses were partly destroyed. Houses which had moved to higher location escaped 
the destruction,  but they, too, would not be free from the danger if there were to be 
a tsunami with short periodicity. After 1960, the town is promoting aprogram  largely 
on the same principle as the former one. This time the construction of concrete 
walls along the coast is also in progress by the national government.
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   In rather small towns and cities like those along the Sanriku coast, water 
fronts are usually near the centers of the port towns. Therefore the above mentioned 
problem to protect the civic centers, and at the same time not to obstruct the 
functions of the ports  becomes  very  serious,. Many of the facilities at the water 
front are indispensable to the ports, and  many peopole work here, but few people 
live. Concerning the defense  work, therefore, the facilities in the area of water 
front can  be handled separately from the town proper where the people actually 
live. Thus in  many projects, high walls are  constructed surrounding the main parts 
of the towns and cities,  leaving the areas of the water front outside the walls. 
In the water front, there will be fish markets, shipyards for  fishing boats, repair 
mills, and also offices of  -fishery association, ice plants and other buildings 
closely connected with the  function of the port. Examples can be seen at  Miyako, 
Shizugawa nd so on.  When  tsunami alarm is given, those who are working at the 
water front are expected to take refuge within the walls through the gates attached 
to them, and shut the steel doors behind them. Fish markets are originally built 
in such a  way that their main parts are large concrete halls with scarce panels, 
and if they were washed by the waves, there would be little fear for the damage. 
(Fig. 13), (also refer to the defense plan of  Shizngawa explained in the following 
section,) The same principle may also  he applied to ice plants, association 
offices,  shipyards and so on. 
   The case of  Kan-raishi is peculiar. Here  is  a  large steel plant of Fuji Seitetsu 
 occupying the majority of the city area. The water front of  Kamaishi port is almost 
monopolized by the company, and an area larger than the city proper is used 
for the storage of  coal, and  for the trucks of  special railroads. The city proper is
Fig. 13. Fish  marl:et outside the wall.  Shizugawa.
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located along the margin of steep hills behind the port area. After the  ShOwa 
Sanriku tsunami of 1933, a road for refuge was constructed in the eastern part of 
the city proper. Thus in Kamaishi, it would not be too difficult to evacuate the 
port area in case of a tsunami, and there would be sufficient time for the citizens 
to take shelter, if necessary, to the higher places behind the city. Thus, in spite 
of the large size of the population, practically no defense work has been carried 
out in Kamaishi.
(5) City planning as a defense against tsunami 
   It is easily done to talk about the complete moving of the business centers 
from the area in danger, especially right after the disaster and when the memory 
is fresh.  When the actual layout is discussed, however, the  difficulty of the 
program and the enormousness of the expenses involved are gradually realized, 
and the plan will be modified into a more conservative one. 
   When a city is destroyed by a tsunami, the afflicted people take emergency 
refuge somewhere. Temporarily, they may stay at schools, temples, factories and 
so on under guidance of local authorities. Often, the municipal offices build 
emergent housings, admittance to which will  be approved with priority to the 
afflicted people. Some of them will remain there for considerable l ngths of 
time, while others will find places to live elsewhere apart from their original 
residence. Many of the people, perhaps, the majority of them, however, return 
to their former places sooner or later. As it is a matter of individual ownership 
of real estate and the amount of money he can spend, there is little room for 
local authorities to interfere. To establish a thorough planning in defense of 
tsunami, local authorities must have a very firm control and an abundant budget. 
They may be entrusted with such a control under combination of rather unusual 
circumstances. Here, the author is going to describe some examples of the 
plannings in which defense of tsunami was taken into consideration. The cases of 
Shizugawa nd Ofunato are the examples. 
A. The case of Shizugawa 
   The town of  Shizugawa was very heavily destroyed by the Chile tsunami on May 
24, 1960. Forty-one people were killed and 965 houses were entirely destroyed, and 
the total amount of the damages was estimated to be about  5,176 million yen. On 
visiting the town today, we can still see the paint marks on the electric poles which 
were put just  after the disaster to indicate the maximum heights of the inflow. In 
most part of the town, the paint marks are higher than the stature of an adult. 
After the tsunami, it was criticized that such unusually heavy damage was due to 
the defects in the road system  and shortage of public facilities. The town office
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immediately started the reconstruction work and the reorganization of the former 
town planning under a five year program. Of course, the defense work by the 
national government also was going on in this town which was one of the worst 
victims of the Chile tsunami. Total budget of this program in Shizugawa by the 
national government was 484 million yen. 
   The total budget of the program bythe town of Shizugawa was 287 million yen, 
of which 46% and 5% respectively, was subsidized by the national and prefectural 
governments. The program included the revisions and enlargement ofmain roads for 
the total length of 1,827 meters, the moving of 252 houses and the construction of 
three  bridges)) The construction of high concrete walls with steel doors and 
water-gates at the mouths of the rivers was carried out by the national govern-
ment separately. The main roads were much widened and straightened, and at the 
crossings of the main roads, the corners of the blocks were cut to make small plazas. 
It is expected that they will faciliate the evacuation from areas in danger in 
case of another tsunami. (Fig. 12) 
B. City plan of Ofunato 
 In Ofunato, an area near the coast was appointed as a defense area. This is 
originally an area with the main factories of this city, and also the area including 
the civic center of the city. Here, under regulation and with a subsidy, all the 
buildings must be of concrete or cement blocks to be resistible against he inflow of 
tsunami waves. They will also be useful as shelters in case of emergency. Roads 
are widened and straightened, and drainage ditches are made along them. Special 
refuge roads are arranged parallel to the main street but in higher locations. 
(6) Separation of a lumber port. 
   Lumbering is an important industry in Sanriku district, and there are many 
sawmills and other factories handling lumber. Logs are also imported from the 
South Seas and recently from the Soviet Union, too. At the time of the Chile 
tsunami, logs were carried by the waves and  when the water retreated, the floating 
logs worked as hammers to destroy the buildings. By this reason the damage was 
much increased at Shizugawa,  Yamada,  Rikuzen-Takada nd so on, where there 
were accumulated logs. In  Miyako, the defense plan includes the construction of a 
port at Kambayashi to the south of city. This is to be used as a lumber port, and 
scatter the function of the port of Miyako. 
(7) Organization of systems for refuge 
   Taught by the experiences, it was started to organize systems for refuge in 
 1) Shizugawa-machi: Ten years ince amalgamation, andfive years ince the  tsunami. 
         1965. (in  Japanese).
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many cities and towns. Municipal offices are in charge of the plans, and usually 
the police and the fire  offices are the centers of the refuge program.  Tsunami 
alarm will be given by the Sendai Meterological Observatory to prefectural 
governments. It will also be broadcast on radio and television. It will be immedi-
ately transmitted to the town offices by telegram, and the police and the fire 
offices in respective place. They will enter the emergency status, and the alarm 
will be announced by radio-cars and by broadcast. The citizens will take refuge 
under guidance of the  officers to the localities with higher altitudes, which are 
appointed as places of refuge in advance. Automobiles also will take refuge follow-
ing the signs given along the streets. Every year, operations for training are made 
on the memorial days of  tsunami; either March the  third  (ShOwa Sanriku tsunami) 
or May the twenty-fourth (Chile  tsunami).') 
   In the city plan of Shizugawa, for instance, straight and wide roads were 
designed to serve as refuge routes. Municipal offices are also entrusted with the 
supervision of water-gates and steel gates in the walls. Such are inspected 
periodically and their effectiveness i  checked. Needless to say, the wide-spread 
 use of radio and televisions i  a great help for the effective operation of such systems. 
The Meteorological Agency in  Tokyo is the center of tsunami alarm, and the first 
priority is given to the transmission of tsunami alarm by telegram.  (Fig. 14).
 POI,I  CE  OFFICE 
 IN  0  NA  CA  WA  POLICE  STATION
RADIO  CAR  I  -
 PRE  PUCE/  R 
 NATURAL  r^I  FASTER
 PREFECTURAL  OFFICE 
 OF  ENi;INEER  INC; 
 PREFECTURAL  OFFICE 
  OF  TAXATION 
  (IN  ONAGAIVA)
 TELEGRAM AND  TEL  EPHONE 
 OFF/  CE  IN  ONA  GA  WA
Fig. 14. System for the propagation of alarm.
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(an example of Onagawa)
CrITIZENSI
V. Problems that remain 
 Thus, the whole coast of  Sanriku is now defended form future tsunami using 
the best of contemporary technology. Defense programs, however, had to be 
 1) Committee for the defense of disasters, Onagawa  town:  Defense programs, Onagawa-
         machi. (in Japanese), 1964.
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made on the basis of experience, and no one can be  sure that there will be no  tsunami 
with magnitudes far surpassing those of the past ones. Natural disasters often 
surpass the imagination of men. However, we cannot prepare for what we cannot 
imagine, and the author thinks that we can say that as far as the tsunami defense 
is concerned, we almost did our best. There still remain some problems that might 
be solved, and situations which might have been solved in different ways from 
what actually were adopted, not to speak of many technical  details. 
    Perhaps, the most serious circumstances that can be anticipated is the 
coincidence of the attack of tsunami with other natural disasters, especially with 
the time of heavy rains. Compared with other parts of Japan, Tohoku is rather 
free from the danger of floods, either in the snow melting season of the spring 
or in the season of typhoons in the fall. Potential danger of floods does exist, 
however, especially when very developed cyclones pass this district bringing much 
rain. Defense walls are constructed to protect he land from invading waves, and 
they inevitably work to slow the drainage, and in spite of the devices for drainage, 
it is more than possible that they will enlarge the menace of floods. 
 Tsunami, by nature, are caused by earthquakes, therefore the combination of 
these two disasters is very probable. The Ojika tsunami of 1939 was an example, 
in which the earthquake was more destructive than tsunami. It caused rather 
slight damage in the district of the Ojika peninsula, Miyagi prefecture, and most 
of the destruction was due to the earthquake. If a great earthquake were to occur 
on land, causing very high tsunami waves with very short time of warning, the 
terrible nature of the disaster would surpass all the imagination. 
   As is seen in the case of Kamaishi,  Miyako andso  on, generally the defense 
works were slow to progress in larger cities. This is understandable b cause there 
are more contradictory interests in larger places than in smaller settlements with 
simpler character, and they make the commencement of engineerings more difficult. 
However, such are the places where larger damages hould be brought about if a 
tsunami were to attack, and where the protection of human lives is more seriously 
in need. 
   Another thing that attracts the author's attention is that in spite of the fact 
that so much care was paid to protect farmland from the waves, surprisingly 
little attention has been paid for the aquiculture. The numerous embayments 
along the Sanriku coast are the scene of aquiculture of oysters and edible sea algae 
like  nori, the  laver, and wakame,  Undania  pinnatilfida, and they receive heavy 
damages when a tsunami attacks. (Fig.  15). Not only the crops are washed away, 
but also the rafts and other facilities to  raise them have received entire destruc-
tion repeatedly. Furthermore, the construction of walls along the coast will
 20  T. NOH
  "`"~°"
Fig. 15. Rafts for the aquiculture  of oysters.  Kesennuma bay.
change the conditions of the shallow sea where the aquiculture is carried on, and 
when the  bay is closed by breakwaters, the changes in tidal flows will inevitably 
affect it. Some of the problems will be solved by indemnity and other methods but 
there will remain many social problems unsolved. The author thinks that in the 
whole program of tsunami defense after  19G0, there is a strong element other than 
mere economic and financial. One  may call it humanity or an idea of social welfare. 
If this is true, more attention should have been paid for the protection of aquiculture. 
    One of the still remaining problems is that of the  semen. as a natural  resource. 
Most of the Sanriku coast belongs to the  Sanriku National Park, and  many of the 
municipalities in this district are planning to develop a tourist industry. There are 
numerous embayments and promontories cattered with picturesque islands 
and sea-cliffs, offering good breeding places for  sea-gulls  and other birds that are 
becoming scarce in other parts of Japan. Natural life, in general, is well preserved 
in this district and many of the wild animals and plants are protected by law as 
natural monuments. Thus this national park has many conditions to attract 
tourists from all over the country. After the construction of defense walls, many 
villages, towns and cities were deprived of the views of the coast. Living near the 
sea, people often cannot see the sea from their houses. Driving along the coast, 
tourists cannot  enjoy the view of the sea for miles and miles. This is not a small 
problem for the future of the tourist industry.  Very careful plans should be made 
concerning the choice of locations for the facilities related to tourism. Some of 
the hotels, restaurants, camping places and so on may perhaps, be compelled to move 
to higher localities in command of better views. Sometimes it will be necessary to 
build new roads in order to secure the former views, if this district is seriously
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interested in the development of a tourist industry. 
   The author has already referred to the lost possibility of combining the defense 
work with highway construction. The same thing may be said about he reclamation 
of shallow sea. Throughout he coast, there is only one case where the construction 
of defense wall was done in association with a reclamation project. This is at 
Otomo bay, five kilometers to the east of Rikuzen-Takada. There should have 
been many possibilities of combining these two types of  projects. Of course, it is 
an argument seen after the fact. The emergent nature of the entire program when 
it was started must well be understood. Nothing can be perfect, and it would not 
be fair if we criticize the sectionalism in the bureaucratic systems too strongly, 
ignoring the efficiency with which this gigantic program was executed.
VI. Conclusion 
   To a qeustion of whether this large scale operation against natural disaster 
was successful or not, we shall be able to secure an answer only in the future. At 
least we can say that it was an epoch-making project in the long history of 
tsunami defense. The author feels that in the accomplishment of this project, 
there is, besides the progress of technology, a strong background of public support 
in the society at large concerning the defense against natural disasters. This enabled 
the government o take such ambitious measures. It is not merely a matter of 
economic effects, but is an expression of the nation's feeling towards the defense of 
       Table 2. Population ofcoastal villages, towns and cities in Sanriku, in 1960.
AOMORI PREFECTURE 
 HigashitOri-mura 
 Rokukasho-mura 
 Omisawa-machi 
 Momoishi-mura 
 Hachinohe-shi 
 Hashikami-mura
IWATE PREFECTURE 
 Taneichi-machi 
 Kuji-shi 
 Noda-mura 
 Fudai-mura 
 Tanobata-mura 
 Iwaizumi-machi 
 Taro-machi 
 Miyako-shi 
 Yamada-machi 
 Otsuchi-machi 
 Kamaishi-shi 
 Sanriku-mura 
 Ofunato-shi 
 Rikuzen-Takada-shi
 12,449 
 13,523 
36,570 
 9,647 
174,348 
10,260
17,625 
37,714 
5,935 
4,603 
6,585 
27,813 
8,321 
55,385 
24,966 
 20,004 
 87,511 
11,417 
35,946 
31,839
MIYAGI  PREFECTL 
 Karakuwa-machi 
  Kesennuma-shi 
 Motoyoshi-machi 
  Utatsu-mura 
 Shizugawa-machi 
 Kitakarni-mura 
 Kahoku-machi 
 Ogatsu-machi 
 Onagawa-machi 
 Ojika-machi 
 Ishinomaki-shi 
 Yamoto-machi 
 Naruse-machi 
 Matsushima-machi 
 Rifu-mura 
 Shiogama-shi 
 Shichigahama-machi 
 Sendai-shi 
 Natori-machi 
 Iwanuma-machi 
 Watari-machi 
 Yamamoto-machi
 EFECTURE
 11,767 
 57,016 
 15,327 
  7,052 
 17,800 
  7,610 
 20,050 
 11,179 
 18,002 
 13,405 
 83,947 
 20,916 
 12,738 
 15,045 
 7,927 
 55,325 
 13,054 
425,272 
33,026 
26,452 
27,277 
16,574
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the land and people. This explains the impression of unbalance, a casual visitor 
might have in looking at the small area of arable land protected by a large concrete 
wall. 
   The author extends his hearty thanks for the kind and generous help he 
received on his survey from various sections of Iwate and Miyagi prefectural 
governments, and the municipal offices in areas he visited. Sincere thanks are 
also presented to the Ministry of Education and the Tohoku Economic Development 
Center, for the research grants awarded to his research group.
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